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Abstract. Laptops are vulnerable to theft, greatly increasing the likelihood of exposing sensitive files. Unfortunately, storing data in a
cryptographic file system does not fully address this problem. Such systems ask the user to imbue them with long-term authority for
decryption, but that authority can be used by anyone who physically possesses the machine. Forcing the user to frequently reestablish his
identity is intrusive, encouraging him to disable encryption.
This tension between usability and security is eliminated through Transient Authentication, in which a small hardware token continuously
authenticates the user’s presence to the laptop over a short-range, wireless link. Whenever the laptop needs decryption authority, it acquires
it from the token; authority is retained only as long as necessary. With careful key management, ZIA imposes an overhead of less than 7%
for representative workloads, though some infrequent operations suffer greater overheads. The largest file cache on our hardware can be
re-encrypted within five seconds of the user’s departure, and restored in just over six seconds after detecting the user’s return. This secures
the machine before an attacker can gain physical access, but recovers full performance before a returning user resumes work. Key granularity
plays an important role in determining performance; assigning encryption keys on a per-directory basis limits the cost of an exposed key
while maintaining acceptable overhead.
1. Introduction
Mobile devices are susceptible to loss and theft because they
are small, light, and easy to carry. Unfortunately, they often
contain sensitive data that their owners would prefer to keep
private. The consequences of exposing such data range from
the inconvenience of canceling credit cards to the public loss
of state secrets. If a user were confident that data on a missing
laptop could not be viewed by unprivileged eyes, he could
simply replace the laptop and restore from backup. Without
that confidence, one must assume the worst.
Cryptographic file systems offer the most common com-
mon defense against the exposure of persistent data. On-disk
data is encrypted and only a legitimate user is able to supply
the decryption key. Usually, decryption keys are supplied dur-
ing login or when mounting the file system, and are retained
for later use. Unfortunately, cryptographic file systems do not
adequately protect the data on a laptop’s disk. If the laptop is
lost or stolen, the decryption key goes with it; as long as the
key is retained, anyone holding the laptop has access to the
data.
The only way to limit this vulnerability is to force the users
resupply decryption keys frequently. Unfortunately, users
find such reauthentication burdensome; it encourages them
to disable security systems that depend on it. For example,
Windows can require users to reauthenticate each time their
laptop awakens from suspension. Most people who are aware
that this feature can be disabled do so.
Security requires frequent reauthentication, but this limits
usability. We resolve this tension with Transient Authentica-
tion, in which the user wears a small authentication token. In
turn, the token continuously authenticates to other devices by
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail: bnoble@umich.edu
means of a short-range, wireless link. In Transient Authenti-
cation, the token stores the user’s capabilities and decryption
keys; proof of these is required to perform any sensitive ac-
tion.
We have applied this model to a cryptographic file sys-
tem, called ZIA, to ensure that the user – or at least her to-
ken – is present for disk operations. Whenever the laptop
reads file system data, it first obtains a decryption key from
the token. If the token (and hence the user) is not present,
the read cannot complete. With ZIA, stolen laptops are pro-
tected from malicious use; an attacker cannot reproduce the
decryption key. The effectiveness of this scheme depends on
a token small enough to be worn unobtrusively, such as an
IBM Linux watch [30]. This makes the token much less vul-
nerable to loss or theft than a device that is carried and of-
ten set down. The core idea of ZIA is simple, but it requires
careful design and implementation. ZIA must not impose un-
due usability burdens or noticeably reduce file system perfor-
mance.
The main contribution of this paper is not the construc-
tion of a cryptographic file system. Blaze’s CFS [2], Zadok’s
Cryptfs [41], and Microsoft’s EFS [29] all address the ar-
chitecture, administration, and cryptographic methods for a
file system. However, all of these systems rely on infrequent
authentication, weakening the protection that cryptography
provides. Some systems, such as EFS, require the user to
reauthenticate after certain events, such as suspension, hi-
bernation, or long idle periods, in an attempt to bound
the window of vulnerability. The user must explicitly pro-
duce a password when any of these events occur. This bur-
den, though small, will encourage some users to disable or
work around the mechanism, rendering its protection for-
feit.
8 CORNER AND NOBLE
2. Design
ZIA’s goal is to provide effective file encryption without re-
ducing performance or usability. All on-disk files are en-
crypted for safety, but all cached files are decrypted for
performance. With its limited hardware and networking per-
formance, the token is not able to encrypt and decrypt file data
without a significant performance penalty. Instead, file keys
are stored on the laptop’s disk, encrypted by a key-encrypting
key. Only an authorized token holds the key-encrypting key,
thus the token is required to read files. This process is illus-
trated in figure 1.
There are two requirements for system security. First, a
user’s token cannot provide key decryption services to other
users’ laptops. Second, the token cannot send decrypted file
keys over the wireless link in cleartext form. Therefore, the
token and laptop use an authenticated, encrypted link. Be-
fore the first use of a token, the user must unlock it using a
PIN. Then he must bind the token and laptop, ensuring that
his token only answers key requests from his laptop. Next,
ZIA mutually authenticates the identity of the token and lap-
top over the wireless link and exchanges a session encryp-
tion key. After authentication, polling ensures that the token,
and thus the user, is still present. When the token is out of
range, ZIA encrypts cached objects for safety. The cache re-
tains these encrypted pages to minimize recovery time when
the user returns, preserving usability. The overall process is
illustrated in figure 2. The remainder of this section presents
the detailed design of ZIA, starting with the trust and threat
model.
2.1. Trust and threat model
Our focus is to defend against attacks involving physical pos-
session of a laptop or proximity to it. Possession enables a
wide range of exploits. If the user leaves his login session
open, attacks are not even necessary; the attacker has all of
the legitimate user’s rights. Even without a current login ses-
sion, console access admits a variety of well-known attacks,
some resulting in root access. An attacker can also bypass
the operating system entirely. For example, one can remove
and inspect the disk using another machine. A determined
Figure 1. Decrypting file encrypting keys. This figure illustrates the process
of file key acquisition. Encrypted file keys are read from disk and shipped to
the token. The token decrypts it and returns the file key. Traffic between the
laptop and token is encrypted, preventing eavesdroppers from obtaining file
keys.
attacker might even probe the physical memory of a running
machine.
ZIA must also defend against exploitation of the wireless
link between the laptop and token: observation, modification,
or insertion of messages. Simple attacks include eavesdrop-
ping in the hopes of obtaining decrypted file keys. A more so-
phisticated attacker might record a session between the token
and laptop, and later steal the laptop in the hopes of decrypt-
ing prior traffic. ZIA defeats these attacks through the use of
well-known, secure mechanisms.
We assume that some collection of users and laptops be-
long to a single administrative domain, within which data can
be shared. The domain includes at least one trusted authority
to simplify key management and rights revocation. However,
the system must be usable even when the laptop is discon-
nected from the rest of the network.
ZIA does not defend against a trusted but malicious user,
who can easily leak sensitive data and potentially extract key
material. ZIA does not provide protection for remote users;
they must be physically present. Attackers that jam the spec-
trum used by the laptop-token channel will effectively deny
users access to their files. Our work is orthogonal to the pre-
vention of network-based exploits such as buffer overflow at-
tacks.
ZIA’s security depends on the limited range of the radio
link between the token and the laptop. Repeaters could be
used to extend this range, though time-based techniques to
defeat such wormhole attacks exist [6,19]. Similarly, an at-
tacker with an arbitrarily powerful and sensitive radio could
extend the range, though such attacks are difficult given the
attenuation of high frequency radios.
Figure 2. Token authentication system. This figure shows the process for
authenticating and interacting with the token. Once an unlocked token is
bound to a laptop, ZIA negotiates session keys and can detect the departure
of the token.
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2.2. Key-encrypting keys
In ZIA, each on-disk object is encrypted by some symmetric
key, Ke. The link connecting the laptop and token is slow,
and the token is much less powerful than the laptop. Con-
sequently, file decryption must take place on the laptop, not
the token. The file system stores each Ke, encrypted by some
key-encrypting key, Kk; we write this as Kk(Ke). Only tokens
know key-encrypting keys; they are never divulged. A token
with the appropriate Kk can decrypt Ke, and hence enable
reading any file encrypted by Ke.
In our model, the local administrative authority is respon-
sible for assigning key-encrypting keys. For reliability in the
face of lost or destroyed tokens, the administrative authority
must also hold these keys in escrow. Otherwise, losing a to-
ken is the equivalent of losing all of one’s files. Escrowed
keys need not be highly available, eliminating the need for
oblivious escrow [4] or similar approaches.
Laptops are typically “owned” by a particular user; in
many settings, one could provide only a single, unique Kk to
each user. However, ZIA must support shared access as well,
because most installations within a single administrative do-
main share notions of identity and privilege. For example,
two colleagues in a department may borrow each others’ ma-
chines, and ZIA cannot preclude such uses. To support shar-
ing, each file key, Ke, can be encrypted by both a user key,
Ku, and some number of group keys, Kg.
The specific semantics of group access and authorization
are left to the file system. For example, one can assign key-
encrypting keys to approximate standard UNIX file protec-
tions. Access to a file in the UNIX model is determined by
dividing the universe of users into three disjoint sets: the file’s
owner, members of the file’s group, and anyone else empow-
ered to log in to that machine. We refer to this last set as the
world. Each user has a particular identity, and is a member of
one or more groups. One could assign a user key, Ku, to each
user; a group key, Kg, to each group; and a world key, Kw, to
each machine. A user’s token holds her specific Ku, each ap-
plicable Kg, and one Kw per machine on which she has an ac-
count. Each file’s encryption key, Ke, is stored on disk, sealed
with its owner’s key, Ku. If a file was readable, writable, or
executable by members of its owning group, Kg(Ke) would
also be stored. Finally, Kw(Ke) would be stored for files that
are world-accessible. Note that the latter is not equivalent to
leaving world-accessible files unencrypted; only those with
login authority on a machine would hold the appropriate Kw.
Group keys have important implications for sharing and re-
vocation in ZIA. Members of a group have the implicit ability
to share files belonging to that group, since each member has
the corresponding Kg. However, if a user leaves a group, that
group’s Kg must be changed to a new K ′g. Furthermore, the
departing user – who is no longer authorized to view these
files – may have access to previously-unsealed file keys. As a
result, re-keying a group requires that the contents of each file
accessible to that group be re-encrypted with a new K ′e, and
that new key be re-sealed with the appropriate key-encrypting
keys.
Re-keying can be done incrementally. To distribute a new
group key, the administrative authority must supply a certi-
fied K ′g to the token of each still-authorized user. This must
be done in a secure environment to prevent exposure of K ′g.
Thereafter, a token encountering a laptop with “old” keys can
continue to use it until it is re-keyed. However, this policy
must be pursued judiciously, since it increases the amount of
data potentially visible to an ejected group member.
2.3. Token vulnerabilities
Tokens provide higher physical security than laptops, since
they are worn rather than carried. Unfortunately, it is still
possible for a user to lose a token. Token loss is a very serious
threat since tokens hold key-encrypting keys. How can we
limit the damage of such an occurrence?
The most serious vulnerability surrounding token loss is
the extraction of key-encrypting keys. PIN-protected, tam-
per-resistant hardware [40] makes this more difficult, as does
storing all Kk encrypted with some password. In either case,
the PIN/password must be known only to the token’s rightful
owner. At first glance, this seems to merely shift the problem
of authentication from the laptop to the token. However, since
the token is worn, it is more physically secure than a laptop
– it is reasonable to allow long-lived authentication between
the token and the user, perhaps on the order of once a day.
Bounding the authentication session between the user and
token also prevents an attacker from profitably stealing a to-
ken, and then later a laptop. After the authentication period
expires, the token will no longer be able to supply any re-
quested Ke. Such schemes can be further improved through
the use of server-assisted protocols to prevent offline dictio-
nary attacks [25], with the laptop playing the role of the server
to the token’s device.
Even tokens that have not been stolen can act as liabilities.
Supposed an attacker has a stolen laptop but no token, and
is sitting near a legitimate user from the same domain. This
tailgating attacker can force the stolen laptop to generate key
decryption requests that could use one of the legitimate user’s
key-encrypting keys. If the legitimate token were to respond,
the system would be compromised.
To prevent this, we provide a mechanism that establishes
bindings between tokens and laptops. Before a token will re-
spond to a particular laptop’s request, the user must acknowl-
edge that he intends to use this token with that laptop. There
are several ways one can accomplish this. For example, a
token with a rudimentary user interface would alert the user
when some new laptop first asks it to decrypt a file key. The
user then chooses to allow or deny that laptop’s current and
future requests. As with token authentication, bindings have
relatively long but bounded duration; after a binding expires,
the token/laptop pair must be rebound. Since a user can use
more than one machine, a token may be bound to more than
one laptop. Likewise, a laptop may have more than one token
bound to it.
User–token authentication and token–laptop binding are
necessarily visible to the user, and thus add to the burden of
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using the system. However, since they are both long-lived,
they require infrequent user action. In practice, they are no
more intrusive than having to unlock your office door once
daily, without the accompanying threat of forgetting to re-lock
it. The right balance between usability and security depends
on the physical nature of the token, its user interface capabil-
ities, and the user population.
2.4. Token–laptop interaction
The binding process must accomplish two things: mutual au-
thentication and session key establishment. Mutual authen-
tication can be provided with public-key cryptography [31].
In public-key systems, each principal has a pair of keys, one
public and one secret. To be secure, each principal’s public
key must be certified, so that it is known to belong to that
principal. Because laptops and tokens fall under the same ad-
ministrative domain, that domain is also responsible for certi-
fying public keys.
ZIA uses the Station-to-Station protocol [14], which com-
bines public-key authentication and Diffie–Hellman key ex-
change. Diffie–Hellman key exchange provides perfect for-
ward security; session keys cannot be reconstructed, even if
the private keys of both endpoints are known. Once a session
key is established, it is used to encrypt all messages between
the laptop and token. Each message includes a nonce, a num-
ber that uniquely identifies a packet within each session to
prevent replay attacks [7]. In addition, the session key is used
to compute a message authentication code, verifying that a
received packet was neither sent nor modified by some mali-
cious third party [33].
2.5. Assigning file keys
What is the right granularity at which to assign file encryption
keys? A small grain size reduces the data exposed if a file key
is revealed, but a larger grain size provides more opportunity
for key caching and re-use.
ZIA hides the latency of key acquisition by overlapping it
with physical disk I/O. Further, it must amortize acquisition
costs by re-using keys when locality suggests that doing so is
beneficial. In light of this, we have chosen to assign file keys
on a per-directory basis.
People tend to put related files together, so files in the same
directory tend to be used at the same time. Therefore, many
file systems place all files in a directory in the same cylinder
group to reduce seek time between them [28]. This makes
it difficult to hide key acquisition costs for per-file keys. In-
stead, since each file in a directory shares the same file key,
key acquisition costs are amortized across intra-directory ac-
cesses. We explore the impact of various choices of key gran-
ularity in section 4.
In our prototype, we store the file key for a directory in
a keyfile within that directory. The keyfile contains two en-
crypted copies of the file key; Ku(Ke) and Kg(Ke), where Ku
and Kg correspond to the directory’s owner and group. We
have chosen not to implement world keys, but adding them
is straightforward. This borrows from the UNIX protection
model, though it does not replicate it exactly. AFS, the An-
drew File System, makes a similar tradeoff in managing ac-
cess control lists on a per-directory basis rather than a per-file
one [36]. However, AFS is motivated by conceptual simplic-
ity and storage overhead, not efficiency in retrieving access
control list entries.
2.6. Handling keys efficiently
Key acquisition time can be a significant expense, so we over-
lap key acquisition with disk operations whenever possible.
Since disk layout policies and other optimizations often re-
duce the opportunity to hide latency, we cache decrypted keys
obtained from the token.
Disk reads provide opportunities for overlap. When a read
requiring an uncached key commences, ZIA asks the token to
decrypt the key in parallel. Unfortunately, writes do not offer
the same opportunity; the key must be in hand to encrypt the
data before the write commences. However, it is likely that
the decryption key is already in the key cache for writes. To
write a file, one must first open it. This open requires a lookup
in the enclosing directory. If this lookup is cached, the file key
is also likely to be cached. If not, then key acquisition can be
overlapped with any disk I/O required for lookup.
Neither overlapping nor caching applies to directory cre-
ation, which requires a fresh key. Since this directory is new,
it cannot have a cached key already in place. Since this is
a write, the key must be acquired before the disk operation
initiates. However, ZIA does not need a particular key to as-
sociate with this directory; any key will do. Therefore, ZIA
can prefetch keys from the authentication token, encrypted
with the current user’s Ku and Kg, to be used for directories
created later. The initial set of fresh keys is prefetched when
the user binds a token to a laptop. Thereafter, if the number
of fresh keys drops below a threshold, a background daemon
obtains more.
Key caching and prefetching greatly reduce the need for
laptop/token interactions. However, frequent assurance that
the token is present is our only defense against intruders. To
provide this assurance, we add a periodic challenge/response
between the laptop and the token. The period must be short
enough that the time to discover an absence plus the time to
secure the machine is less than that required for a physical
attack. It also must be long enough to impose only a light
load on the system. We currently set the interval to be one
second; this is long enough to produce no measurable load,
but shorter than the time to protect the laptop in the worst
case. Thus, it does not contribute substantially to the window
in which an attacker can work.
2.7. Departure and return
When the token does not respond to key requests or chal-
lenges, the user is declared absent. All file system state must
be protected and all cached file keys flushed. When the user
returns, ZIA must re-fetch file keys and restore the file cache
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to its pre-departure state. This process should be transparent
to the user: it should complete before he resumes work.
There are two reasons why a laptop might not receive a
response from the token. The user could truly be away, or
the link may have dropped a packet. ZIA must recover from
the latter to avoid imposing a performance penalty on a still-
present user. To accomplish this, we use the expected round
trip time between the laptop and the token. Because this is a
single, uncongested network hop, this time is relatively stable.
ZIA retries key requests if responses are not received within a
tunable amount of time, with a total of three attempts. Retries
do not employ exponential backoff, since we expect losses to
be due to link noise, not congestion; congestion from nearby
users is unlikely because of the short radio range.
If there is still no response, the user is declared absent and
the file system must be secured. ZIA first removes all name
mappings from the name cache, forcing any new operations
to block during lookup. ZIA then walks the list of its cached
pages, removing the clear text versions of the pages. There
are two ways to accomplish this: writing dirty pages to disk
and zeroing the cache, or encrypting all cached pages in place.
Zeroing the cache has the attractive property that little
work is required to secure the machine. Most pages will
be clean, and do not need to be written to disk. However,
when the user returns, ZIA must recover and decrypt pages
that were in the cache. They are likely to be scattered across
the disk, so this will be expensive.
Instead, ZIA encrypts all of the cached pages in place.
Each page belongs to a file on disk, with a matching file key.
The page descriptor holds a reference to the cached, decrypted
key. Referenced keys may not be evicted – they are wired in
the cache. Without a corresponding key, there would be no
way to encrypt a cached page, and such keys cannot be ob-
tained from the now-departed token.
The expense of encryption is tolerable given our goal of
foiling a physical attack. For example, the largest file cache
we can observe on our hardware can be encrypted within five
seconds. To be successful, an attacker would have to gain
possession of the machine and extract information within that
time – an unlikely occurrence.
While the user is absent, most disk operations block un-
til the token is once again within range; ZIA then resumes
pending operations. This means that background processes
cannot continue while the user is away. In a physically se-
cure location, such as an office building, fixed beacons can
provide authentication in lieu of the user. Unfortunately, such
beacons would not prevent intra-office theft and must be used
judiciously. At insecure locations, such as an airport, the user
must not leave unencrypted data exposed and background
computation should not be enabled. This would defeat the
purpose of the system.
2.8. Laptop vulnerabilities
What happens when a laptop is stolen or lost? Since ZIA
automatically secures the file system, no data can be ex-
tracted from the disk. Likewise, all file keys and session keys
have been zeroed in memory. However, the laptop’s private
key, sd, must remain on the laptop to allow transparent re-
authentication. If the attacker recovers sd, he can impersonate
a valid laptop. To defend against this, the user must remove
the binding between the token and the stolen device. This
capability can be provided through a simple interface on the
token. Use of tamper-resistant hardware in the laptop would
make extracting sd more difficult.
Instead of offline inspection, suppose an attacker modifies
the device and returns it to a user. Now the system may con-
tain trojans, nullifying all protections afforded by ZIA. Any
device that is stolen, and later recovered, should be regarded
as suspect and not used. Secure booting [9,21] can be used to
guard against this attack.
3. Implementation
Our implementation of ZIA consists of two parts: an in-kernel
encryption module and a user-level authentication system.
The kernel portion provides cryptographic I/O, manages file
keys, and polls for the token’s presence. The authentication
system consists of a client on the user’s laptop and a server on
the token, communicating via a secured channel.
Figure 3 is a block diagram of the ZIA prototype. The ker-
nel module handles all operations intended for our file sys-
tem and forwards key requests to the authentication system.
We used FiST [42], a tool for constructing stackable file sys-
tems [17,35], to build our kernel-resident code. This code is
integrated with the Linux 2.4.18 kernel.
The authentication system consists of two components.
The client, keyiod, runs on the laptop, and the server,
keyd, runs on the token; both are written in C. The client
handles session establishment and request retransmission.
The server must respond to key decryption and polling re-
quests. The processing requirements of keyd are small
Figure 3. An overall view of ZIA. This figure shows ZIA’s design. The kernel
module handles cryptographic file I/O. The authentication client and server
manage key decryption and detect token proximity. A key cache is included
to improve performance.
12 CORNER AND NOBLE
enough that it can be implemented in a simple, low-power
device.
3.1. Kernel module
In Linux, all file system calls pass through the Virtual File
System (VFS) layer [23]. VFS provides an abstract view of
the file systems supported by the OS. A stackable file sys-
tem inserts services between the concrete implementations of
an upper and lower file system. FiST implements a general
mechanism for manipulating page data and file names; this
makes it ideal for constructing cryptographic file services.
The FiST distribution also includes a proof-of-concept cryp-
tographic file system, Cryptfs.
3.1.1. File and name encryption
The kernel module encrypts both file pages and file names
with the Rijndael cipher [13]. We selected Rijndael for
two reasons. First, it has been chosen as NIST’s Advanced
Encryption Standard, AES. Second, it has excellent perfor-
mance, particularly for key setup – a serious concern in the
face of per-directory keys.
ZIA preserves file sizes under encryption. File pages are
encrypted in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode with a 16
byte block. We use the inode and page offsets to compute
a different initialization vector for each page of a file. Tail
portions that are not an even 16 bytes are encrypted in cipher
feedback mode (CFB). We chose CFB rather than ciphertext
stealing [12], since we are concerned with preventing expo-
sure, not providing integrity.
ZIA does not preserve the size of file names under encryp-
tion; they are further encoded in Base-64, ensuring that en-
crypted filenames use only printable characters. Otherwise,
the underlying file system might reject encrypted file names
as invalid. In exchange, limits on file and path name sizes
are reduced by 25%. Cryptfs made the same decision for the
same reasons [41].
The kernel module performs two additional tasks. First,
the module prefetches fresh file keys to be used during di-
rectory creation. Second, the module manages the storage of
encrypted keys. The underlying file system stores keys in a
keyfile, but keyfiles are not visible within ZIA. This is done
for transparency, not security; on-disk file keys are always en-
crypted.
3.1.2. Polling, disconnection, and reconnection
ZIA periodically polls the token to ensure that the user is still
present. The polling period must be longer than a small mul-
tiple of network round-trip time, but shorter than the time re-
quired for an adversary to obtain and inspect the laptop. This
window is between hundreds of milliseconds and tens of sec-
onds. We chose a period of one second; this generates un-
noticeable traffic, but provides tight control. Demonstrated
knowledge of the session key is sufficient to prove the token’s
presence. Therefore, a poll message need only be an exchange
of nonces [7]: the device sends a number, n, encrypted with
the key and the token returns n + 1 encrypted by the same
key. The kernel is responsible for polling; it cannot depend
on a user-level process to declare the token absent, since it
must be fail-stop. Similarly, if the user suspends the laptop,
or it suspends itself due to inactivity, the kernel treats this as
equivalent to loss of communication.
If the kernel declares the user absent, it secures the file
system. Cached data is encrypted, decrypted file keys are
flushed, and both are marked invalid. We added a flag to
the page structure to distinguish encrypted pages from those
that were invalidated through other means. Most I/O in ZIA
blocks during the user’s absence; non-blocking operations re-
turn the appropriate error code.
When keyiod reestablishes a secure connection with the
token, two things happen. First, decrypted file keys are re-
fetched from the token. Second, file pages are decrypted and
made valid. As pages are made valid, any operations blocked
on them resume. We considered overlapping key validation
with page decryption to improve restore latency. However,
the simpler scheme is sufficiently fast.
3.2. Authentication system
The authentication system is implemented in user space for
convenience. All laptop–token communication is encrypted
and authenticated by session keys plus nonces. Communica-
tion between the laptop and the token uses UDP rather than
TCP, so that we can provide our own retransmission mech-
anism. This enables a more aggressive schedule, since con-
gestion is not a concern. We declare the user absent after
three dropped messages; this parameter is tunable. The to-
ken, in the form of keyd, holds all of a user’s key-encrypting
keys. Since session establishment is the most taxing opera-
tion required of keyd, and it is infrequent, keyd is easily
implemented on low-power hardware.
4. Evaluation
In evaluating ZIA, we set out to answer the following ques-
tions:
• What is the cost of key acquisition?
• What overhead does ZIA impose? What level of overhead
do particular operations incur?
• Can ZIA secure the machine quickly enough to prevent
attacks when the user departs? Can ZIA recover system
state before a returning user resumes work?
• What are the energy requirements for the token?
To answer these questions, we subjected our prototype to a
variety of benchmarks. For these experiments, the client ma-
chine was an IBM ThinkPad X24, with 256 MB of physical
memory, a 1.1 GHz Pentium III CPU, and an IBM Travelstar
IC25N030ATC504-0 30.0 GB IDE disk drive with a 12 ms
average seek time. The token was a Compaq iPAQ 3870 with
64 MB of RAM. Both the iPAQ and laptop ran Linux 2.4.18.
For each experiment the laptop and token were connected by
either an 802.11 wireless network running in ad hoc mode at
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Experiment Time (msec)
Decrypt key w/802.11 9.56 (0.48)
Decrypt key w/Bluetooth 64.63 (7.72)
Decrypt key processing 2.58 (0.22)
10 new keys w/802.11 48.38 (8.65)
10 new keys w/Bluetooth 131.35 (8.18)
10 new keys processing 31.77 (1.38)
Figure 4. Key acquisition cost. This table shows the round trip time required
to acquire fresh and decrypted keys from the token. Token processing time is
also shown for both requests. Bluetooth’s higher latency substantially effects
key acquisition time.
1 Mb/s or by Bluetooth running in PAN mode. The X24 has
a builtin 802.11 interface, while the iPAQ used a PCMCIA
expansion pack with an 802.11 card. The Bluetooth setup
consisted of a PCMCIA card in the laptop, the iPAQ’s inter-
nal Bluetooth interface, and the Bluez Linux protocol stack.
The typical round trip time for standard ping messages was
55 ms for Bluetooth and 1 ms for 802.11. All AES file keys
and session keys were 128 bits long. The token is somewhat
more powerful than current wearable devices. However, the
rapid advancements in embedded, low-power devices makes
this a realistic token in the near future.
4.1. Key acquisition
Our first task is to compare the cost of key acquisition with
typical file access times. To do so, we measured the round
trip time for two typical laptop–token interactions: a request
for a single key decryption and a request for a batch of 10
fresh keys. We also measured the amount of token processing
time for each request. Note that the round trip time includes
this processing time. The results are shown in figure 4. In
each case, we used 50 data points and we report the mean and
standard deviation.
Using 802.11, the cost to decrypt a key is similar to the
average seek time of the disk in our laptops, though layout
policy and other disk optimizations will tend to reduce seek
costs. Our Bluetooth radios had much higher latencies than
802.11, impacting the cost of acquiring fresh and decrypted
keys. Computation time could be reduced by caching de-
crypted keys and pre-generating fresh keys.
4.2. ZIA overhead
Our second goal is to understand the overhead imposed by
ZIA on typical system operation. Our benchmark is simi-
lar to the Andrew Benchmark [18] in structure. The Andrew
Benchmark consists of copying a source tree, traversing the
tree and its contents, and compiling it. We use the Apache
2.0.43 source tree. It is 28.2 MB in size; when compiled,
the total tree occupies 59.7 MB. We pre-configure the source
tree for each trial of the benchmark, since the configuration
step does not involve appreciable I/O in the test file system.
While the Andrew Benchmark is well known, it does have
several shortcomings; the primary one is a marked depen-
dence on compiler performance. In light of this, we also sub-
ject ZIA to three I/O-intensive workloads: directory creation,
directory traversal, and tree copying. The first two highlight
the cost of key creation and acquisition. The third measures
the cost of data encryption and decryption.
4.2.1. Modified Andrew Benchmark
We compare the performance of Linux’s ext2fs against six
stacking file systems: Base+, Cryptfs, ZIA-FS, ZIA, ZIA-
FILE, and ZIA-NPC. Base+ is a null stacked file system. It
transfers file pages but provides no name translation. Cryptfs
adds file and name encryption; it uses a single, static key for
the entire file system. Both Base+ and Cryptfs are samples
from the FiST distribution [42]. To provide a fair comparison,
we replaced Blowfish [37] with Rijndael in Cryptfs, improv-
ing its performance. The ZIA file system is as described in
this paper. For comparison purposes ZIA-FS uses one key for
the whole file system and ZIA-FILE uses one key per file and
one per directory listing. ZIA-NPC uses per-directory keys
and obtains a key on every disk access; it provides neither
caching nor prefetching of keys.
Each experiment consists of 20 runs. Before each set, we
compile the same source in a separate location. This ensures
that the test does not include the effects of loading the com-
piler and linker from a separate file system. Each run uses
separate source and destination directories to avoid caching
files and name translations. The results for 802.11 and Blue-
tooth are shown in figure 5.
The results for ext2fs give baseline performance. The re-
sult for Base+ quantifies the penalty for using a stacking file
system. Cryptfs adds overhead for encrypting and decrypting
file pages and names. ZIA encompasses both of these penal-
ties, plus any costs due to key retrieval, token communication
and key storage.
For this benchmark, 802.11 ZIA imposes less than a 7%
penalty over ext2fs. Its performance is statistically indistin-
guishable from that of Cryptfs, which uses a single key for all
cryptographic operations. Using Bluetooth, ZIA imposes less
than a 15% overhead over ext2fs. This is due to increased
overhead in the mkdir and cp phases; these expose Blue-
tooth’s higher cost in retrieving fresh keys.
We also ran the experiment using ZIA-NPC, which uses
no key caching or prefetching optimizations. The results are
shown in figure 6. Key caching is critical; without it, ZIA-
NPC is more than four times slower than ext2fs. Bluetooth’s
extra latency exaggerates this effect making ZIA-NPC more
than 25 times slower than ext2fs.
4.2.2. I/O intensive benchmarks
Although the Modified Andrew Benchmark shows only a
small overhead, I/O intensive workloads will incur larger
penalties. We conducted three benchmarks to quantify them.
The first two stress directory operations, and the third mea-
sures the cost of copying data in bulk.
The first experiment measures the time to create 5000 di-
rectories, each containing a zero length file. The results are
shown in figure 7. Each new directory requires ZIA to write
a new keyfile to the disk, adding an extra disk write to each
operation; the write-behind policy of ext2fs keeps these over-
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5. Modified Andrew Benchmark. (a) All file systems and ZIA over
802.11. (b) Ext2fs and ZIA over Bluetooth. This shows the performance of
Ext2fs against five stacked file systems using a Modified Andrew Benchmark.
(a) All the file systems compared to ZIA running over 802.11; (b) ext2fs com-
pared to ZIA using Bluetooth. When using per-directory or per-mount keys,
802.11 ZIA has an overhead of less than 7% in comparison to an Ext2fs sys-
tem and performs similarly to a simple single key encryption system, Cryptfs.
Figure 6. Modified Andrew Benchmark. This figure compares the optimized
version of ZIA against ZIA-NPC, which uses no key caching or fresh key
prefetching. Both 802.11 and Bluetooth are shown. The percentage over-
head is in comparison to the raw file system. Optimizations are crucial to
the performance of the system and high Bluetooth latencies exaggerate this
effect.
File system Time (s) Over Ext2fs
Ext2fs 10.05 (0.01) –
Base+ 10.60 (0.47) 5.5%
Cryptfs 11.06 (0.01) 10.1%
ZIA-FS 11.04 (0.01) 9.9%
ZIA 17.21 (0.36) 71.3%
ZIA-FILE 36.00 (1.47) 258.2%
(a)
File system Time (s) Over Ext2fs
Ext2fs 10.05 (0.01) –
ZIA-FS 12.02 (0.01) 19.6%
ZIA 27.05 (0.01) 169.2%
ZIA-FILE 57.43 (0.60) 471.6%
(b)
Figure 7. Creating directories. (a) 802.11. (b) Bluetooth. This table shows
the performance for the creation of 5000 directories, each containing one
zero-length file. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Although ZIA
has a cache of fresh keys for directory creation, it must write those keyfiles
to disk.
File system Time (s) Over Ext2fs
Ext2fs 2.00 (0.87) –
Base+ 2.89 (0.67) 44.9%
Cryptfs 2.95 (0.53) 47.9%
ZIA-FS 3.10 (0.87) 55.5%
ZIA 51.61 (2.57) 2485.7%
ZIA-FILE 64.91 (3.83) 3151.9%
(a)
File system Time (s) Over Ext2fs
Ext2fs 2.00 (0.87) –
ZIA-FS 3.20 (0.97) 60.1%
ZIA 356.80 (2.73) 17776.3%
ZIA-FILE 369.50 (4.06) 18413.2%
(b)
Figure 8. Scanning directories. (a) 802.11. (b) Bluetooth. This table shows
the performance for reading 5000 directories, each containing one zero-
length file. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. In this case, ZIA
must synchronously acquire each file key.
heads manageable. In addition, the filenames must be en-
crypted, accounting for the rest of the overhead. ZIA-FILE
additionally writes a key for each newly created file, adding
additional overhead.
The next benchmark examines ZIA’s overhead for reading
5000 directories and a zero length file in each directory. This
stresses keyfile reads and key acquisition. Note that without
the empty file ZIA does not need the decrypted key and the
token would never be used. We ran a find across the 5000
directories and files created during the previous experiment.
We flushed the cache between tests to make sure the name
cache was not a factor. The results are shown in figure 8.
The results show a large overhead for ZIA. This is not sur-
prising since we have created a file layout with the smallest
degree of directory locality possible. ZIA is forced to fetch
5000 keys, one for each directory; there is no locality for
key caching to exploit. This inserts a network round trip into
reading the contents of each directory, accounting for an extra
10 milliseconds per directory read. An optimization in ZIA-
PROTECTING FILE SYSTEMS WITH TRANSIENT AUTHENTICATION 15
File system Time (s) Over Ext2fs
Ext2fs 21.24 (0.39) –
Base+ 22.61 (0.58) 6.4%
Cryptfs 23.13 (0.21) 8.9%
ZIA-FS 26.99 (0.21) 27.1%
ZIA 28.20 (0.35) 32.8%
ZIA-FILE 53.11 (1.15) 150.0%
(a)
File system Time (s) Over Ext2fs
Ext2fs 21.24 (0.39) –
ZIA-FS 27.54 (0.49) 29.7%
ZIA 31.80 (0.53) 49.7%
ZIA-FILE 149.59 (0.88) 604.3%
(b)
Figure 9. Copying within the file system. (a) 802.11. (b) Bluetooth. This ta-
ble shows the performance for copying a 66 MB source tree from one direc-
tory in the file system to another. Standard deviations are shown in parenthe-
ses. Synchronously decrypting and encrypting each file page adds overhead
to each page copy. This is true for ZIA as well as Cryptfs.
FILE, reads and prefetches the decrypted key for the zero-
length file. This reduces file read time in the common case.
However, this benchmark does not need this decrypted key, so
it does not need to wait for the response from the token. How-
ever, the act of reading this key from disk adds to the overhead
shown for ZIA-FILE. ZIA-FS only needs to fetch one key
from the token, giving it similar performance to Cryptfs.
Each directory read in ZIA requires a keyfile read and a
key acquisition in addition to the work done by the underly-
ing ext2fs. Interestingly, the amount of unmasked acquisition
time plus the time to read the keyfile was similar to the mea-
sured acquisition costs. To better understand this phenom-
enon, we instrumented the internals of the directory opera-
tions. Surprisingly, the directory read completed in a few tens
of microseconds, while the keyfile read was a typical disk ac-
cess. We believe that this is because, in our benchmark, key-
files and directory pages are always placed on the same disk
track. In this situation, the track buffer will contain the direc-
tory page before it is requested.
It is likely that an aged file system would not show such
consistent behavior [38]. Nevertheless, we are considering
moving keyfiles out of directories and into a separate location
in the lower file system. Since keys are small, one could read
them in batches, in the hopes of prefetching useful encrypted
file keys. When encrypted keys are already in hand, the di-
rectory read would no longer be found in the track buffer, and
would have to go to disk. However, this time would be over-
lapped with key acquisition, reducing total overheads.
The final I/O intensive experiment is to copy the Pine 4.21
source tree from one part of the file system to another. The
initial files are copied in and then the cache is flushed to avoid
caching effects. This measures data intensive operations. The
Pine source is 66.1 MB spread across 50 directories. The re-
sults are shown in figure 9. In light of the earlier experiments,
it is clear why Crypt and ZIA are slow in comparison to Base+
and Ext2fs. Each file page is synchronously decrypted after a
read and protected before a write.
(a)
(b)
Figure 10. 802.11 disconnection and reconnection. (a) ZIA. (b) ZIA-FILE.
This plot shows the disconnection encryption time and reconnection decryp-
tion time for ZIA and ZIA-FILE over 802.11. The line shows the time re-
quired to encrypt all the file pages when the token moves out of range. The
blocks show the time required to refetch all the cached keys and decrypt the
cached file pages. Per-file keys takes a similar amount of time to secure, but
much longer to restore.
4.3. Departure and return
In addition to good performance, ZIA must have two addi-
tional properties. For security, all file page data must be en-
crypted soon after a user departs. To be usable, ZIA should
restore the machine to the pre-departure state before the user
resumes work. Recall that when the user leaves, the system
encrypts the file pages in place. When the user returns, ZIA
requests decryption of all keys in the key cache and then de-
crypts the data in the page cache. To measure both disconnec-
tion and reconnection time, we copied several source direc-
tories of various sizes into ZIA and ZIA-FILE, removed the
token, and then brought it back into range. Figure 10 shows
these results for 802.11, and figure 11 shows the results for
Bluetooth. The line shows the time required to secure the file
system and the points represent the time required to restore
it. The right-most points on the graph represent the largest
file cache we could produce in our test system; this is roughly
half the available memory due to caching of encrypted and
decrypted pages in the stacking implementation.
The encryption time depends solely on the amount of data
in the page cache. Unsurprisingly, encryption time is linear
with page cache size and not dependent on key granularity.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 11. Disconnection and reconnection. (a) ZIA. (b) ZIA-FILE. This
plot shows the disconnection encryption time and reconnection decryption
time for ZIA and ZIA-FILE over Bluetooth.
Decryption is also linear, though key fetching requires a vari-
able amount of time due to the unknown number of keys in the
cache. ZIA-FILE uses a much larger number of keys, slowing
its recovery time. We believe that a window of five seconds is
too short for a thief to obtain the laptop and examine the con-
tents of the page cache. Furthermore, the user should come
back to a system with a warm cache. Once the user is within
radio range, he must walk to the laptop, sit down, and resume
work; this is likely to be more than six seconds.
4.4. Energy
To gain user acceptance, and minimize users removing the
token for charging, the energy budget of the token must be
carefully managed. Unfortunately, without building a pro-
totype closer to production size and efficiency, it is difficult
to measure the energy requirements of the token. Although
the energy density is likely to be similar, the device will be
smaller in size than an iPAQ. However, extra functionality on
the iPAQ, including a full scale OS and significant flash mem-
ory, are extraneous power sinks. A production token may also
use a more energy efficient wireless link, as the extra func-
tionality of Bluetooth, and the high power of 802.11, are un-
necessary.
In order to obtain an estimate of energy usage, we ran
the token unplugged responding to constant polling messages.
Both the 802.11 and Bluetooth tests were conducted using the
iPAQ external expansion jacket which contains an additional
battery. In a single trial, the 802.11 token ran for 3 hours
38 minutes. Using Bluetooth it ran for 11 hours 58 minutes.
5. Related work
To the best of our knowledge, ZIA is the first system to pro-
vide encrypted filing services that defend against physical
attack while imposing negligible usability and performance
burdens on a trusted user. ZIA accomplishes this by separat-
ing the long-term authority to act on the user’s behalf from the
entity performing the actions. The actor holds this authority
only over the short term, and refreshes it as necessary.
There are a number of file systems that provide transpar-
ent encryption for files; the best known is CFS [2]. CFS is
built as an indirection layer between applications and an arbi-
trary underlying file system. This layer is implemented as a
“thin” NFS server that composes encryption atop some other,
locally-available file system. Keys are assigned on a direc-
tory tree basis. These trees are exposed to the user; the secure
file system consists of a set of one or more top-level subtrees,
each protected by a single key.
When mounting a secure directory tree in CFS, the user
must supply the decryption keys via a pass-phrase. These
keys remain in force until the user consciously revokes them.
This is an explicit design decision, intended to reduce the bur-
den on users of the system. In exchange, the security of the
system is weakened by vesting long-term authority with the
laptop. CFS also provides for the use of smart cards to pro-
vide keys [3], but they too are fetched at mount time rather
than periodically. Even if fetched periodically, a user would
be tempted to leave the smart card in the machine most of the
time.
SC-CFS [22] also employs a smart-card for providing
keys, but in a much tighter security framework. It provides
a separate key per-file, using the smart-card to generate them.
In addition, it changes the key every time the file is writ-
ten, ensuring confidentiality even when previous keys are ex-
posed. This mechanism creates considerable file system over-
head.
Due to their use of an NFS server, both CFS’ and SC-CFS’
total overhead can be substantial. One way to implement a
cryptographic file system more efficiently is to place it in the
kernel, avoiding cross-domain copies. TCFS [8] moves the
system into the kernel, and addresses some of the ease-of-
use issues in CFS. It also provides data integrity checks and
group sharing of files. TCFS main advantage over CFS is the
placement of encryption and decryption in the client, allowing
the thin NFS server to reside in a distributed server.
Many other systems exist for providing secure local
and network file storage. Some provide integrity, such as
SUNDR [27] and PFS [39] and SFSRO [16], or add confi-
dentiality, such as SFS [26]. Some distributed file systems
only protect the communication between clients and servers,
such as Echo [1], and not the stored files themselves.
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There are also commercial file encryption systems such as
Microsoft’s Encrypting File System (EFS) [29]. While EFS
solves many administrative issues, it is essentially no different
from CFS. A single password serves as the key-encrypting
key for on-disk, per-file keys. EFS still depends on screen
saver or suspension locks to revoke this key-encrypting key,
rather than departure of the authorized user. The user may
disable the screen saver or suspension locks after finding them
intrusive. Anecdotally, we have found that many Windows
2000 laptop users have done exactly that.
The task of kernel integration is simplified by a stackable
file system infrastructure [17,35]. Stackable file systems pro-
vide the ability to interpose layers below, within, or above ex-
isting file systems, enabling incremental construction of ser-
vices. FiST [42] is a language and associated compiler for
constructing portable, stackable file system layers. We use
FiST in our own implementation, though our use of the vir-
tual memory and buffer cache mechanisms native to Linux
would require effort to port to other operating systems. We
have found FiST to be a very useful tool in constructing file
system services.
Cryptfs is the most complete prior example of a stacking
implementation of encryption. It was first implemented as a
custom-built, stacked layer [41], and later built as an exam-
ple use of FiST. Cryptfs – in both forms – shares many of the
goals and shortcomings of CFS. A user supplies his keys only
once; thereafter, the file system is empowered to decrypt files
on the user’s behalf. Cryptfs significantly outperforms CFS,
and our benchmarks show Cryptfs in an even better light. This
is primarily due to the replacement of Blowfish [37] with Ri-
jndael [13].
Several efforts have used proximity-based hardware to-
kens to detect the presence of an authorized user. Land-
wehr [24] proposes disabling hardware access to the keyboard
and mouse when the trusted user is away. This system does
not fully defend against physical possession attacks, since the
contents of disk and possibly memory may be inspected at the
attacker’s leisure. Similar systems have reached the commer-
cial world. For example, the XyLoc token system [15] emits
a unique ID using a wire loop and a battery. Unfortunately the
security of this device depends on the difficulty in replicating
the device from eavesdropping the ID.
CyberLocator [11] has proposed using location authenti-
cation using GPS satellites; their particular interest is in af-
firming the location of Internet gamblers. Unfortunately, this
technique would be unsuitable for hand-held devices and lap-
tops. GPS must have a line-of-sight to geo-synchronous satel-
lites, and laptop users are typically inside. Also the accuracy
of such a system is 100 meter in the worst case, far enough
for a laptop to be out of sight of the user.
Rather than use passwords or hardware tokens, one could
instead use biometrics. Biometric authentication schemes in-
trude on users in two ways. The first is the false-negative
rate: the chance of rejecting of a valid user [34]. For face
recognition, this ranges between 10% and 40%, depending
on the amount of time between training and using the recog-
nition system. For fingerprints, the false-negative rate can be
as high as 44%, depending on the subject. The second in-
trusion stems from physical constraints. For example, a user
must touch a special reader to validate his fingerprint. Such
burdens encourage users to disable or work around biomet-
ric protection. A notable exception is iris recognition. It can
have a low false-negative rate, and can be performed unobtru-
sively [32]. However, doing so requires three cameras – an
expensive and bulky proposition for a laptop.
I/O software [20] is developing a product based on proxim-
ity location provided by Bluetooth in conjunction with facial
recognition software. Their intention is to use proximity as
a cue to indicate the loss of biometric authentication. The
combination of proximity sensing with biometrics address
the lack of continuous biometric authentication, however the
false negative rate will be problematic. The Bluetooth dis-
tance measurement system, developed by Bluesoft [5], would
require additional mechanisms to provide security.
6. Conclusion
Because laptops are vulnerable to theft, they require addi-
tional protection against physical attacks. Without such pro-
tection, anyone in possession of a laptop is also in posses-
sion of all of its data. Current cryptographic file systems do
not offer this protection, because the user grants the file sys-
tem long-term authority to decrypt on his behalf. Closing this
vulnerability with available mechanisms – passwords, secure
hardware, or biometrics – would place unpleasant burdens on
the user, encouraging him to forfeit security entirely.
This paper presents our solution to this problem: Transient
Authentication. In it, a user wears an authentication token that
retains the long-term authority to act on his behalf. A laptop,
connected to the token by a short-range wireless link, obtains
this authority only when it is needed. Applying this scheme to
a cryptographic file, called ZIA, system imposes an overhead
of less than 7% above the local file system for representative
workloads; this is indistinguishable from the costs of simple
encryption.
If the user leaves, the laptop encrypts any cached file sys-
tem data. For the largest buffer cache on our hardware, this
process takes less than five seconds – less time than would be
required for a nearby thief to examine data. Once the user is
back in range, the file system is restored to pre-departure state
within six seconds. The user never notices a performance loss
on return. ZIA thus prevents physical possession attacks with-
out imposing any performance or usability burden.
We are currently extending ZIA’s model to system services
and applications [10]. By protecting application state and ac-
cess to sensitive services, ZIA can protect the entire machine
– not just the file system – from attack.
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